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  We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a 
sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the 
impact of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium. 
For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a fixed number of creditors, we derive an 
optimal CAC threshold and (ii) given a fixed CAC threshold, as the number of 
creditors becomes larger, we show a convergence to efficient information 
aggregation. Moreover, strengthening CACs may actually increase the ex ante 
probability of adverse shock. Our analysis makes the case for a formal 
sovereign bankruptcy procedure. 
  
Keywords: Sovereign Debt, Bargaining, Coordination, Moral Hazard, 
Collective Action Clauses. 





Following Mexico’s debt moratorium in 1982, there was a large-scale
write-down under the Brady Plan and the market’s response has been
to switch from bank …nance to bond-…nance (Eichengreen and Portes,
1995). Typically, emerging markets issue New York bonds, which re-
quire the unanimous consent of all creditors to change any …nancial
terms1. This requirement makes these sovereign debt contracts di¢cult
to restructure (Roubini and Setser, 2003) thus substantially reducing
the perceived risk of restructuring (Cline, 1984; Buchheit, 1999). How-
ever, a rash of emerging market liquidity crises during the 1990s, and
the more recent Argentinian default, demonstrate that sovereign bonds,
nevertheless, carry substantial default risk.
To reign back a seemingly unending series of bailouts2, two principal
mechanisms were considered: (a) an o¢cial Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing Mechanism(SDRM), based on Chapter11 of the US bankruptcy code
(Krueger, 2001) and (b) the market-driven adoption of Collective Action
Clauses (hereafter, CACs3) in debt contracts as in the nineteenth cen-
1The …nancial terms are narrowly de…ned as payment dates and principal of the
bond contract.
2The failure to bailout Russia in 1998 came as a shock to investors and sovereign
risk premium rose to double …gures.
3According to the current market practice, CACs consist of two main parts: the
acceleration clauses and the majority restructuring provision. “The acceleration
clauses are designed to limit the ability of a minority of bondholders in disrupt-
ing the restructuring process. According to these clauses, a vote by 25 percent of
outstanding principal is needed to accelerate the claims and a vote of more than 50
percent is required to de-accelerate these claims. The majority restructuring provi-
sion allows a “quali…ed majority of bondholders of an issuance to bind all holders
of that issuance to the …nancial terms of a restructuring, either before or after a
default,” (IMF, 2002, p.2). The majority restructuring provision enables the “matu-
rity date, the amount of interest and principal, and the currency of payment to be
modi…ed by a vote of a quali…ed majority of bondholders,” (IMF, 2002, p.4).
1tury London capital market (Buchheit, 1999; Ghosal and Miller, 2003).
The former has proved unpopular4. So CACs have been strongly pro-
moted as a viable, market-driven alternative (Taylor, 2002), with Mexico
taking a lead in early 2003 by issuing a $1 billion bond containing CACs
in New York. Subsequently, other countries, such as South Korea, South
Africa and Brazil, also issued bonds with CACs in New York.
Kletzer (2004a) notes a potential drawback with strengtheningCACs:
interest rate premiums may actually rise with the inclusion of CACs in
sovereign bond contract if creditors expect debtor moral hazard to dom-
inate the bene…ts of easier, less costly restructuring. In addition, empiri-
cal studies in this area provide a mixed results for the impact of CACs on
interest rate premium. Eichengreen and Mody (2004) study the launch
spreads on emerging market bonds – both bonds subject to UK govern-
ing law and those subject to New York law – and …nd that CACs reduce
the borrowing cost for more creditworthy issuers, while the less credit-
worthy issuers need to pay higher spreads for issuing bonds that contain
CACs. Eichengreen et al. (2003) include both primary and secondary
market premiums in their study and also …nd that the credit rating of
the issuer plays a crucial role. On the contrary, Becker et al. (2003)
and Richards and Gugiatti (2003) …nd that, by considering the yields in
the secondary markets, the inclusion of CACs in a bond issue did not
increase the interest rate premium (and not change the bond prices) for
that particular bond. Their results seem to support the ambiguous im-
pact of CACs on cost of borrowing and bond prices. Weinschelbaum and
4One reason why is that a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure requires chang-
ing the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, a possibility which has been resisted by
large borrowers and the US.
2Wynne (2005) challenge the conclusions from previous empirical results
and argue that the results obtained by the previous empirical studies
do not account for (endogenous) IMF intervention and compositional ef-
fects in the markets for sovereign debt. They argue that CACs could be
irrelevant in the sovereign debt markets and therefore, yield spreads with
and without CACs are uninformative about moral hazard problems.
Kletzer (2003), in a formal model of bargaining, has shown that
strengthening CACs away from unanimity leads to welfare gains in post-
default scenarios. Pitchford and Wright (2007) argue that introducing
CACs increases welfare in post-default scenarios and has a net positive
impact on welfare even after issues relating to debtor moral hazard are
taken into account.
In this paper, we study the e¤ect of strengthening CACs in an in-
complete information debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. In
equilibrium scenarios where the actions of creditors do not depend on
their privately observed signals, strengthening CACs away from unanim-
ity eliminates the power of individual creditor holdouts. However, both
situations where the debt rollover occurs with a probability zero or one
are equilibria and strengthening CACs by itself does not determine which
equilibrium creditors coordinate on. There is still a role for third parties
(like the IMF or courts) or creditor coordination committees which are
substitutes for CACs. Moreover, when the future net worth of the new
one-period debt is low, the equilibrium where debt rollover occurs with
a probability one is not necessarily interim e¢cient.
In equilibrium scenarios where individual creditor best responses are
sensitive to her signals, coordination of actions across creditors depends
3on payo¤ relevant uncertainty. In such equilibrium scenarios, where
creditors use threshold strategies, strengthening CACs does reduce cri-
sis risk. Given a …xed number of creditors, we derive an interim optimal
CAC threshold. However, we also show that given a …xed CAC thresh-
old, as the number of creditors becomes larger5, in equilibrium, there is a
convergence to e¢cient information aggregation. For a …xed (and …nite)
number of creditors, given the strategy of other creditors, each creditor’s
decision to accept the debt rollover increases the probability of a suc-
cessful debt rollover and therefore imposes an externality6 on all other
creditors. When the debt contract involves a large number of creditors,
each creditor becomes small (relative to the group of creditors taken as
a whole) and her marginal impact on the continuation probability of a
successful debt rollover becomes zero. In the limit, there is an e¢cient
information aggregation.
Taken together our results, in contrast to existing work, caution
against concluding that strengthening CACs necessarily improves wel-
fare in post-default interactions between the debtor and creditors. Our
results imply that strengthening CACs is most e¤ective in the scenarios
with a small number of creditors but it is precisely in such scenarios
that creditors will have access to other, perhaps more e¤ective explicit
coordination mechanisms (like the creditor committees).
With ex ante debtor moral hazard, in general, achieving both ex ante
e¢ciency and interim e¢ciency may not be possible. Further, strength-
5In order to ensure that we compare like-for-like, per capita creditor payo¤s are
kept constant throughout the limiting argument.
6Given the number of creditors, whether this externality is negative (respectively,
positive) depends on whether the …xed CAC threshold is above (respectively, below)
the value of the interim optimal CAC threshold.
4ening CACs may adversely impact the debtor’s ex ante incentives and
actually increase the ex ante probability of adverse shock.
Finally, we study the policy implications of our formal analysis. The
IMF has an informational advantage in verifying the precise nature of
policy e¤ort undertaken by the debtor, and ensuring that bailouts help
matters by sending out public signals so that creditors coordinate on
the appropriate equilibrium in the debt rollover game. However, IMF
bailouts could also have an adverse impact as the problem of creditor
moral hazard might emerge.
An important element in our analysis is the con‡ict between ex ante
e¢ciency and interim e¢ciency due to ex ante debtor moral hazard. A
limitation of CACs is that it cannot address ex ante issues. This raises
the question of whether there is a role for an appropriately designed
formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure that addresses both ex ante and
ex post issues. We outline such a procedure.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next subsec-
tion discusses related literature. In section 2, we study the debt rollover
in the debt rollover game with incomplete information. In section 3, we
show how the probability of adverse shock can be endogenized by study-
ing the ex ante debtor moral hazard. Section 4 is devoted to policy
issues while section 5 concludes. Some of the more technical materials
are reported in the appendix.
1.1 Related literature
Kletzer (2004b), building on the analysis of Kletzer and Wright (2000)
(see also Bulow and Rogo¤, 1989), studies a model of debtor-creditor
5bargaining where strengthening CACs eliminates the ine¢ciency of cred-
itor holdout. Some of our results are very di¤erent. First, we show that
the e¤ect of strengthening CACs depends critically on which equilibrium
prevails in the debt rollover game. Second, when strengthening CACs
has a positive impact, we derive an optimal CAC threshold. In Kletzer
and Wright (2000), a higher probability of disagreement has a higher
impact on the debtor willingness to pay. In a related work, Eichengreen
et al. (2003) predict that CACs will be able to price ex ante debtor
moral hazard by lowering the borrowing cost for a creditworthy issuer
but increasing the borrowing cost for less creditworthy issuer. We show
that a positive crisis risk is necessary for resolving the incentive issues
related to ex ante debtor moral hazard and that in general, there is
a con‡ict between ex ante and interim e¢ciency. While in Gai et al.
(2004), Roubini and Setser (2004) and Tanaka (2006) the crisis cost is
exogenous to the mechanism of debt write-down, in our model, the cri-
sis cost is endogenous through the threat of having an endogenously
generated interim crisis risk.
WeinschelbaumandWynne (2005) study howCACs determine debtor
country’ governments’ …scal incentives, bond yields and probability of
default. Their empirical results have already been noted. In their theo-
retical model, they show that CACs are useful in coordinating creditors
within the same jurisdiction. Strengthening CACs lowers the cost of re-
structuring debt. However, strengthening CACs can also have an impact
on the debtor government’s incentive to run reckless …scal policies that
increase the possibility of crisis.
Our analysis complements Tirole (2003) who provides a rationale
6for debt …nance, short maturities, and foreign currency denomination
of liabilities by adopting a “dual-and-common agency” perspective. His
formal analysis takes as exogenous both the probability of adverse shock
and the probability of a debt crisis, conditional on default. In contrast,
here while the maturity structure of debt is taken as given, both the
probability of adverse shock and the probability of debt crisis, condi-
tional on default, are endogenous.
Our results are consistent with the empirical studies, which support
the ambiguous e¤ects of CACs. Eichengreen and Mody (2000, 2004)
conduct empirical investigations basing on the primary market yields
and conjecture that the credit rating of the issuer matter. This result is
con…rmed by Eichengreen et al. (2003) who expand the data to include
both primary and secondary market yields. Using data for both primary
and secondary market yields, Becker et al. (2003), however, report that
the use of CACs in a bond issue did not increase the cost of borrowing for
that particular bond. Richards and Gugiatti (2003) …nd that CACs do
not have a signi…cant impact on bond pricing in the secondary market.
Our model predicts that strengthening CACs will reduce borrowing costs
for issuer with high credit rating only when it lowers interim crisis risk.
Our analysis of the e¢cacy of various policy interventions is related to
Rodrik (1998) who suggests that, when …nancing development by issuing
bonds exposes the country to excessive crises, the unrestricted use of such
debt instruments should be limited.
Finally, in contrast to the unique equilibrium obtained in the litera-
ture on global games which study coordination games with asymmetric
information (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998),
7here, conditional on default, we obtain multiple Bayesian equilibria. In
our paper, the way payo¤s to creditors are indexed by the underlying
fundamentals ensures that an extreme form of coordination failure be-
tween creditors always exists for all values of the fundamentals. In the
global games literature, in contrast, the way payo¤s to creditors are in-
dexed by the underlying fundamentals ensures that there are always two
extreme regions in the space of fundamentals with a strongly dominant
action7.
2 Debt rollover with incomplete information
2.1 The model
There are three time periods,  = 012. At  = 0, a sovereign debtor
embarks on a project which is …nanced by bonds, each with a face value
of , issued at  = 0. The two-period bonds are sold to  identical private
creditors. The promised return for each private creditor is  at  = 1 and
(1 + ) at  = 2. For future reference, note that all payo¤s are denoted
in  = 1 units.
We assume that the sovereign debtor’s capacity to service the existing
debt at  = 1 is determined by the …scal resources not already committed
elsewhere. Suppose, for the moment, that at  = 1 there is an exogenous
and unanticipated (at  = 0) shock8 so that the available …scal resources
7There are, of course, other technical di¤erences. We look at a model with a
…nite number of creditors (although we do study the limit of Bayesian equilibria
as the number of creditors becomes large). In our model, the (privately observed)
signalling has …nite support.
8An example of such adverse shock could be a devaluation when sovereign debt
is denominated in dollars. Later in this paper, we extend the model to endogenize
the probability of adverse shock and allow creditors to anticipate such shock with a
correct probability.
8are less than the payment due tocreditors, . This triggers a “technical
default” at  = 1.
Conditional on default at  = 1, the debtor issues a new one-period
bond rolling over the outstanding interest and capital owed in the ex-
isting two-period bond. Simultaneously, each private creditor decides
whether or not to roll over, i.e. accepting the new one-period debt is-
sued by the debtor. If the proportion of creditors who reject the debt
rollover exceeds the critical CAC threshold, a “sovereign debt crisis”
occurs9
Built into the existing two-period sovereign debt contract is a crit-





, where  denotes the proportion of private
creditors that are needed to block a successful debt rollover at  = 1
i.e.  represents the critical CAC threshold10. In general, increasing
 is equivalent to strengthening CACs, which would make debt rollover
easier. Moreover, since all the private creditors are ex ante symmetric,
by invoking the doctrine of pari passu, we will assume that any o¤er
made by the debtor treats each creditor symmetrically.
The new one-period bond has a face value of  and promises a return
of (1 + ). Therefore, a successful debt rollover implies that, at  = 2,
the amount falling due becomes (1 + ) +(1 + ) = (1 + )
2  which
at  = 1 (using 1
(1+) as the discount factor) is worth (1 + ). We …nd
9It is important to note the distinction between a technical default and a sovereign
debt crisis. A technical default occurs when the sovereign debtor is unable to pay the
promised returns to the private creditors in the …rst period due to the occurrence of
an adverse shock. Conditional on default, debt rollover game takes place and each
creditor decides whether to accept the debt rollover. A sovereign debt crisis only
occurs when a su¢ciently large number of creditors decide not to roll over the debts.
10Consider the case when  = 1
. In this case, a decision of only one private credi-
tor not to roll over the short-term debts is su¢cient for the project to be terminated.
This is, in fact, equivalent to requiring a unanimity in the debt rollover decision.
9it convenient to work with normalized per capita creditor payo¤s, which
are obtained by dividing the gross creditor payo¤s by (1+). Thus, in
normalized per capita creditor payo¤s, the amount owed by the debtor
to each creditor at  = 2 is 1.
Conditional on default at  = 1, the normalized per capita creditor
payo¤s are determined by  where  2 [01] is the actual worth of
the new one-period bond issued by the debtor so that  (1 + )
2  is the
amount actually paid out by the debtor at  = 2. The (prior) probability
over  is given by some continuous probability density function () (with
() being the associated cumulative probability distribution).
Conditional on default at  = 1, there is incomplete information: each
private creditor  receives a privately observed signal  2 f ¡  + g
of the true value of  where   0 but small. Speci…cally,   ¹ , ¹   0
and ¹   1
 for large but …nite   2. Conditional on , for each ,  is







We label an individual private creditor by , where  = 1. Each
creditor privately observes a signal . Conditional on , each creditor
chooses an action  () 2 fAccept (), Reject ()g. A strategy of
the creditor  is a map that speci…es an action for each . Conditional
on ¾ = (1), let (¾) = (1 (1)()). For each , let
~  () = #f :  () = g denote the number of private creditors who
choose to reject the debt rollover when the value of the signal is . Given
, let  () = ~  ( ¡ )+~  ( + ) denote the number of creditors who
reject the debt rollover. Conditional on , in order to determine each
11Of course, when  = 0,  =  for all  and when  = 1,  = 1 ¡  for all .
Appropriate adjustments to all expressions involving signals need to be made at the
boundary: these are not explicitly stated in the text.
10creditor ’s payo¤s, there are two scenarios to be considered:
1.  () ¸ . In this scenario, the private creditors successfully
reject the debt rollover, a debt crisis occurs and litigation ensues. If
 () = , the normalized per capita creditor payo¤ is  while if  () =
, the normalized per capita payo¤ to creditor  is , where   12.
2.  ()  . In this scenario, the debt rollover is successful. If
 () = , the normalized per capita creditor payo¤ is  ¡ , while if
 () = , the normalized per capita payo¤ to creditor  is , where 
is the privately borne legal cost for the individual creditor who rejects
the debt rollover but whose attempt is unsuccessful. We assume that
  , i.e. the payo¤ to any individual creditor of being a second mover
in the asset grab race is higher than the privately borne legal cost from
an unsuccessful attempt to stop the debt rollover.
Conditional on default, after observing her private signal, each cred-
itor simultaneously decides whether or not to accept the debt rollover.
We study the Bayesian equilibria of this game. In most policy dis-
cussions, and in our model, creditors have to decide whether or not to
accept the debt rollover conditional on default but before all payo¤ rel-
evant uncertainty has been fully revealed. Accordingly, we ask whether
relative to a …rst-best benchmark13 the equilibrium crisis risk is interim
e¢cient14.
12Let  =  ¡ 0
(1+), while  =  ¡ 00
(1+), where (a) the parameters  and 
denote the liquidation payo¤s (expressed as a proportion of (1 + )) to creditors
with 0    1, 0    1 and    and (b) 0 and 00 denote the privately borne
legal cost of entering into the asset grab race. The assumption    implies that
   and 00  0 which we interpret as the …rst-mover advantage in the asset grab
race which ensues when the debt rollover is rejected.
13The …rst-best benchmark corresponds to the case with complete information
about the future net worth of the new one-period debt.
14From an ex ante viewpoint, the relevant welfare comparison would have to take
112.2 Creditor coordination and CACs
We study two di¤erent equilibrium scenarios, one where the actions of
creditors do not depend on their privately observed signals and the other
where they do.
We begin by noting an extreme form of coordination failure between
creditors: conditional on default, it is always an equilibrium for all cred-
itors to choose not to roll over irrespective of their signals. As long as
  ¡1
 , if  ¡ 1 creditors reject the debt rollover, then the remaining
creditor will also reject the debt rollover. Evidently, in such a scenario,
strengthening CACs will have no e¤ect on the debt rollover.
At the other extreme, when   1
, there is also always an equilib-
rium where the debt is rolled over with a probability one. Indeed, if all
other creditors agree to a debt rollover (i.e. accept the new one-period
bond issued by the sovereign debtor after a technical default occurs at
 = 1), a deviation by an individual creditor cannot terminate the debt
rollover. Note that such an equilibrium persists even when the signal
observed by an individual creditor, , is close to zero.
It follows that for each  2 [01] and privately observed signal ,
as long as 1
    ¡1
 , both action pro…les, one where each creditor
agrees to a debt rollover and the other where each creditor rejects the
debt rollover, are both Bayesian equilibria. Therefore, starting from a
situation where  = 1
, increasing  (which is equivalent to strengthen-
ing CACs away from unanimity to remove the possibility of an individual
into account both states of the world where the debt is rolled over and states of the
world where the debt is not rolled over. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume
that in the …rst-best ex ante scenario, the project will be funded.
12creditor holdout) implies that a new equilibrium where debt rollover oc-
curs with a probability one exists.
However, even here strengthening CACs by itself does not necessarily
lead to the resolution of a sovereign debt crisis: there is still a role for
third parties (like the IMFor courts) or creditor coordination committees
to ensure that creditors coordinate on the equilibrium where the debt
rollover occurs with a probability one.
Furthermore, there is no reason why, for low values of  and hence,
, the equilibrium where debt rollover occurs with a probability one is
e¢cient.
Next, we show that there are other equilibria where creditors choose
threshold strategies i.e. a creditor rejects the debt rollover as long as
her privately observed signal is below a certain threshold. For such
equilibria, creditor coordination depends on payo¤ relevant uncertainty.
Suppose all creditors use a symmetric threshold strategy so that for
some ¹  2 [01], whenever  ¸ ¹ , creditor  rolls over, but whenever
  ¹ , creditor  does not roll over. Let us denote such a strategy
con…guration by ¹ . Conditional on observing , let 
 (¹ ) denote
creditor ’s expected payo¤ from not agreeing to the debt rollover and

 (¹ ) denote creditor ’s expected payo¤ from agreeing to a debt
rollover. Note that when creditor  is choosing a best response, (a)
whenever 
 (¹ ) ¡ 
 (¹ )  0, creditor  does not agree to the
debt rollover, (b) whenever 
 (¹ )¡
 (¹ ) · 0, creditor  agrees
to the debt rollover15.
15In the main body of the paper, we have assumed, for simplicity, that a creditor
always agrees to the debt rollover if she is indi¤erent between agreeing and not
agreeing to the debt rollover. The general case where each creditor  rolls over
13Given the strategies of other creditors, conditional on observing a sig-
nal , from the perspective of any one creditor, in general, the number
of other creditors not agreeing to the debt rollover is a random variable.
For any private creditor , given , if all other private creditors  6=  are
following a symmetric threshold strategies ¹ , and creditor  observes a
signal  = ¹ , let ¹  ( ¹ ) 16 denote the probability that exactly  other
creditors (from a population of ¡1 other creditors) do not agree to the
debt rollover. Given a threshold strategy ¹ , notice that f¹  (¹ )g
¡1
=0 is
a symmetric binomial distribution and by computation, for two di¤er-







 (), i.e. the distribution f¹  (¹ )g
¡1
=0 is identical to the distribution
f¹ 0 (¹ 0)g
¡1
=0.
Next, we compute creditor ’s expected payo¤s under two cases: (i)
when she agrees to the debt rollover and (ii) when she does not agree
to the debt rollover. Let17 () = maxf0 ¡ 2g. For any private
creditor , given , if all other private creditors  6=  are following a
symmetric threshold strategies ¹ , conditional on observing the signal
 = ¹ , creditor ’s expected payo¤ from not agreeing to the debt rollover
is given by the expression 
 (¹ ¹ ) = 
¡1 X
=¡1




while creditor ’s expected payo¤ from agreeing to the debt rollover is
given by the expression 
 (¹ ¹ ) = 
¡1 X
=





 (¹ ¹ ) and 
 (¹ ¹ ) are increasing linear functions of ¹ 
the debt with probability  and does not roll over with probability (1 ¡ ), where
0 ·  · 1, is straightforward but is computationally tedious. All computations for
the general case are reported in Appendix A.
16The exact expression for ¹  (¹ ) is contained in Appendix A.
17In what follows, we assume, for ease of exposition, that  is an integer.
14and the slope of 
 (¹ ¹ ) is steeper than the slope of 
 (¹ ¹ ). When
¹  is close to zero, 
 (¹ ¹ )  
 (¹ ¹ ) as long as  is small enough. It
follows that there is a ¹ ¤















and whenever ¹ ¤
 · 1, ¹ ¤
 is a Bayesian equilibrium threshold; it is
interior when ¹ ¤
  1. A Bayesian interior equilibrium threshold is
depicted in …gure 1 below.
Figure 1: A Bayesian interior equilibrium threshold















What is the impact of strengthening CACs? Strengthening CACs
(equivalently, increasing ) increases the proportion of private creditors
required to prevent a successful debt rollover. We …nd that the impact
of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium
15in the debt rollover game. For the Bayesian equilibria with extreme
coordination failure, as previously discussed, strengthening CACs has
no impact. However, when there is an interior Bayesian equilibrium
threshold, ¹ ¤
, it is possible to show that ¹ ¤
 is decreasing in . Figure
2 below depicts how the graphs of 
 (¹ ¹ ) and 
 (¹ ¹ ) change
with  (again detailed derivations are contained in Appendix A). As
 increases, the events where there is a successful debt rollover have
a higher probability. By using the expressions for creditor payo¤s, it
follows that, as  increases, (a) below , 
 (¹ ¹ ) decreases in value
while, above , 
 (¹ ¹ ) increases in value, i.e. the graph of 
 (¹ ¹ )
becomes steeper (when  increases) and (b) below  + , 
 (¹ ¹ )
increases in value while above +, 
 (¹ ¹ ) decreases in value i.e. the
graph of 
 (¹ ¹ ) becomes ‡atter (when  increases). Thus, for higher
values of , the point of intersection between 
 (¹ ¹ ) and 
 (¹ ¹ )
now must be lower in value. It, therefore, follows that strengthening
CACs reduces crisis risk. Figure 2 illustrates.
Next, we ask whether the interim crisis risk is ine¢ciently high or
ine¢ciently low. Interim e¢ciency corresponds with the situation when
there is a complete information about . Interim e¢ciency requires
that the private creditor should only not agree to the debt rollover if
her payo¤ when debt rollover is successful (thus project continues to
completion at  = 2), given by , is less than or equal to the payo¤ she
receives from being the …rst mover in the asset grab-race that ensues
when debt rollover is unsuccessful (thus project is liquidated at  = 1),
given by . Therefore, the requirement for interim e¢ciency is that
16Figure 2: Impact of strengthening Collective Action Clauses
 · .
With incomplete information about  (which is the case we consider
here) and under our assumptions, a creditor’s expected payo¤ from a
successful debt rollover is the expected value of  conditional on her pri-
vately observed signal : this is simply equal to . In general, Bayesian
equilibria where the actions of creditors do not depend on their privately
observed signals cannot be e¢cient. When creditors use threshold strate-
gies, using the expression derived for ¹ ¤
, by computation, for a …xed ,
our results show that when  = 1
, ¹ ¤
  , while when  = 1, ¹ ¤
  .
Correcting for integer e¤ects, there exists a value of , called ^ , for
which ¹ ¤
^  = . Thus, for a …xed , ^  is the interim optimal CAC
threshold.
Next, for a …xed , we study what happen to the interior Bayesian
equilibrium threshold, ¹ ¤
, when  becomes in…nitely large18. We show
18We assume that all the per capita payo¤ variables like ,  and  are held …xed
in the limiting argument.
17that for all 0    1
2 (and symmetrically, for all 1
2    1), as
 ! 1, ¹ ¤
 ! . It follows that the larger the number of creditors,
the smaller is the ine¢ciency associated with a Bayesian equilibrium in
threshold strategies and in the limit, the ine¢ciency vanishes.
The formal arguments underlying this result relies on a version of
the central limit theorem and is quite technical. We, therefore, present
these arguments in Appendix B. Here we point out that the e¢ciency
is obtained in the limit due to e¢cient information aggregation. For a
…xed , given the strategy of other creditors, each creditor’s decision to
accept the debt rollover increases the probability of a successful debt
rollover and therefore imposes an externality on all other creditors. As
already pointed out, given the number of creditors, whether this exter-
nality is negative (respectively, positive) depends on whether the …xed
CAC threshold is above (respectively, below) the value of the interim
optimal CAC threshold, ^ . As  ! 1, each creditor becomes small
(relative to the group of creditors taken as a whole) thus her marginal
impact on the continuation probability of a successful debt rollover be-
comes zero and there is an e¢cient information aggregation.
The following proposition summarizes the e¢ciency result obtained
here.
Proposition 1 (E¢ciency) (i) Strengthening CACs (increasing , for
a …xed ) reduces crisis risk i.e. ¹ ¤
 is decreasing in  and we derive
an interim optimal CAC threshold ^ . (ii) For all 0    1
2 (and
symmetrically, for all 1
2    1), as  ! 1, ¹ ¤
 !  i.e. strengthening
CACs works only when  is not too large as we …nd that, for a …xed value
18of the CAC threshold of   0,   1, the larger the number of creditors
(higher ), the smaller is the ine¢ciency associated with a Bayesian
equilibrium in threshold strategies and, in the limit (as  ! 1), the
ine¢ciency vanishes.
We interpret Proposition 1 as castingdoubt on the e¢cacy of strength-
ening CACs in resolving sovereign debt crisis. With a …xed number of
creditors, when creditors use threshold strategies, CACs do improve in-
terim e¢ciency of a debt rollover and it is possible to derive an optimal
CAC threshold. However, for any …xed CAC threshold, as the number of
creditors becomes larger, the ine¢ciency associated with an equilibrium
in threshold strategies becomes smaller and vanishes in the limit. Propo-
sition 1 suggests that CACs are most e¤ective in scenarios with a small
number of creditors but it is precisely in such scenarios that creditors
will have access to other, perhaps more e¤ective explicit coordination
mechanisms (like creditor committees).
3 Ex ante debtor moral hazard
There are two main motivations for studying ex ante debtor moral haz-
ard. First, we would like to endogenize the probability of adverse shock.
Second, we want to rule out the possibility of long-term bullet debt con-
tracts maturing at  = 2. In principle, the presence of long-term bullet
debt contracts maturing at  = 2 could be welfare improving in that it
would rule out interim ine¢cient creditor coordination. With ex ante
debtor moral hazard, a positive crisis risk, conditional on default, is a
necessary condition for resolving debtor’s ex ante incentives. Therefore,
long-term bullet debt contracts will not to be used with ex ante debtor
19moral hazard.
We denote the ex ante action of the debtor by 0, where 0 2 fg
and  and  denote good and bad ex ante e¤ort by the debtor, re-
spectively19. We assume that 0 2
©
ª
denote the cost of e¤ort,
measured in  = 1 payo¤ units. We also assume that it is more costly
for the debtor to exert good e¤ort than to choose bad e¤ort so   .
Let 0 denote the ex ante probability of adverse shock when the ex
ante action 0 2 fg is chosen by the debtor. We assume that the
probability of adverse shock is higher if the debtor chooses bad e¤ort
so   . If there is no adverse shock or if there is a successful debt
rollover at  = 1, the debtor obtains a non-contractible payo¤   020;
otherwise, the debtor obtains a payo¤ of zero. We also assume that, con-
ditional on default, creditors have to decide whether or not to roll over
the debt before observing the ex ante choice of action by the debtor21.
We will also assume that the ex ante optimality requires that the debtor
chooses 0 = 
As a function of the equilibrium threshold ¹ ¤
 prevailing in the debt
19In this context, good e¤ort could correspond to a situation where money is bor-
rowed and used to promote R&D in the export sector and bad e¤ort could correspond
to transferring borrowed money to local elites who are then free to put it in tax havens
overseas. Refer to Ghosal and Miller (2003) for more examples on ex ante debtor
moral hazard and for other relevant results.
20Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), we interpret this non-contractible payo¤
as the bene…t at  = 1 of gain in national output at  = 2 when a debt crisis
is prevented at  = 1. Another example of such non-contractible payo¤ can be
described as follows. Suppose the funds borrowed by the sovereign are used to …nance
a publicly operated infrastructure project. If the infrastructure project succeeds, the
government enjoys the prospect of higher tax revenue as more domestic and foreign
…rms invest and employment is generated. No private creditor can attach the future
tax revenues generated by the infrastructure project.
21For instance, it takes time for the debtor’s action to be revealed and creditors
have to decide whether or not to agree to the debt rollover before the action of the
debtor is revealed.
20rollover game, let (¹ ¤
) denote the debtor’s expected payo¤ conditional
on default, measured in  = 1 payo¤ units. The debtor’s payo¤ from
choosing a good e¤ort is given by the expression (1¡) +(¹ ¤
)¡
, while the debtor’s payo¤ from choosing a bad e¤ort is given by
the expression (1 ¡ ) + (¹ ¤
) ¡ . The incentive compatibility
constraint, which ensures that the sovereign debtor chooses good e¤ort,





























(¡)  0, there is no solution to the debtor’s ex ante incentive
problem. On the other hand, if   ¡
¡, a solution is possible.
Suppose   ¡
¡ so that a solution to the debtor’s ex ante in-
centive problem is possible. Let ¹ denote the interim e¢cient equi-
librium threshold in the debt rollover game. If (¹ )   +
(¡)
(¡),
interim e¢ciency and ex ante e¢ciency are incompatible. By computa-
tion, (¹ ) = (1 ¡ (¹  + ))+
£
(¹  + ) ¡ (¹  ¡ )
¤
[Pr ^  ], where Pr ^  is the probability of
a successful debt rollover at the interim e¢cient CAC threshold, ^ . Note
that (1) = 0 (the debtor’s payo¤ from an unsuccessful debt rollover)
and clearly, as long as   0, (¹ )  (1). More generally, by
21computation, it is checked that (¹ ¤
) is decreasing in ¹ ¤
. Therefore,
if (¹ )   +
(¡)
(¡)  0, there will be an equilibrium threshold in
the debt rollover game that ensures ex ante e¢ciency but necessarily
requires interim ine¢ciency. Clearly, strengthening CACs so that ¹ ¤

converges to ¹  can actually increase the probability of adverse shock.
We summarize the above discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 2 With ex ante debtor moral hazard, a positive interim
crisis risk, conditional on default, is necessary to solve the debtor’s ex
ante incentives. In general, there is a con‡ict between interim and ex
ante e¢ciency. Strengthening CACs may actually increase the ex ante
probability of adverse shock.
4 Evaluating policy interventions
4.1 IMF intervention as a public signal
In the previous sections, we have shown that the ex post policy inter-
vention, such as strengthening CACs, depends critically on which equi-
librium prevails in the debt rollover game. Typically, the IMF has an
informational advantage over private creditors because the IMF can ver-
ify the precise nature of the policy e¤ort undertaken by the debtor.
When there is a technical default, conditional on putting in place appro-
priate structural adjustment e¤ort, the IMF usually provides loans22 to
the debtor so that her debt servicing obligation can be met in the …rst
period. Our model suggests that if, in addition, the IMF conditions its
22These loans are used by the debtor to pay o¤ its existing creditors. According
to Fischer (2001) and Miller and Zhang (2000), the IMF is e¤ectively gamed into
providing bailouts in order to avoid the disorderly default by the sovereign debtor.
22support on the outcome of the debt rollover game, any such intervention
will have a bigger marginal impact on the incentives of the debtor to
choose higher policy e¤ort.
Conditional on the technical default, any announcement by the IMF
serves as a public signal to the creditors. Why should this help? In the
debt rollover game, the creditors can use this public signal to coordinate
on the appropriate equilibrium. However, it is important to note that
IMF intervention might, at the same time, give rise to the problem of
creditor moral hazard as, with bailout, each creditor is now e¤ectively
insured against the possibility of default.
4.2 A sovereign bankruptcy procedure
In our model, we have assumed that the sovereign debtor obtains a payo¤
in the second period if the project continues to completion and such
payo¤ is non-contractible23. An important element in our analysis is the
con‡ict between ex ante e¢ciency and interim e¢ciency due to ex ante
debtor moral hazard. A limitation of CACs is that it cannot address
ex ante issues. This raises the question of whether there is a role for
an appropriately designed formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure that
addresses both ex ante and ex post issues. The key element of such
procedure relies on the ability of the court in making the debtor’s non-
contractible payo¤ becomes contractible ex ante24. With those elements
23Such payo¤ determines the debtor’s incentive to bargain with the private credi-
tors in the …rst period.
24It is, in practice, di¢cult to establish a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure
if it requires the court to make the debtor’s non-contractible payo¤s realized at  = 2
to become contractible as it is only the sovereign debtor who usually has a private
information about the non-contractible payo¤ not the court nor the private creditors.
23being embedded to it, such appropriately designed sovereign bankruptcy
procedure is useful in solving the problem of ex ante debtor moral hazard
and leading to more orderly sovereign debt restructuring. In fact, this
view has also been shared by several authors, including Sachs (1995),
Buchheit and Gulati (2002) and Krueger (2001, 2002).
In what follows, we outline a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure
similar to the SDRM outlined by Anne Krueger of the IMF (Krueger,
2001). First, such a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure would re-
quire establishing an international sovereign bankruptcy court. Second,
such a court will need to ensure (and the sovereign debtor to credibly
commit to) some ‘contractibility’ on sovereign debtor’s non-contractible
payo¤s (realized at  = 2) and that some foreign interest payments and
loans could be diverted in favor of creditors as part of the bargaining
process. Third, following an adverse shock, when a technical default oc-
curs, the bankruptcy court would order a ‘standstill’, which legitimizes
the suspension of payments and protects the debtor from litigation (by
‘vultures’) that might inhibit debtor-creditor negotiations (Miller and
Zhang, 2000). The standstill would provide a breathing space for a ‘dis-
covery phase’, a period when the bankruptcy court tries to discover the
future net worth, , of any restructured debt. Let ^  denote the pay-
o¤ measured in period  = 1 units which makes each private creditor
indi¤erent between investing in the project and the risk-free security.
Finally, during the resolution phase, the court would enforce a transfer
^  ¡ to each creditor. When ^  ¡ · 
, then using the debtor’s payo¤s,
both capacity to repay at  = 1 and the future payo¤ realized at  = 2,
is enough to guarantee participation by creditors in the market for sov-
24ereign debt. On the other hand, when ^  ¡  
, either the court would
have to order a debt restructuring or a debt write-down.
To summarize, …rst, note that any payments made in the resolution
phase can be made conditional on the policy e¤ort undertaken by the
debtor. Second, since this particular formal sovereign bankruptcy proce-
dure makes some of the debtor’s non-contractible future payo¤ become
contractible ex ante, it is useful in solving the ex ante debtor moral
hazard.
5 Conclusion
We develop a model of sovereign debt crisis when lending takes place
through the bond markets. We study the interaction between ine¢-
ciencies in the debt rollover game and ex ante debtor moral hazard.
Conditional on a technical default, there are multiple, interim ine¢cient
equilibrium outcomes and the impact of strengthening CACs depends
on the prevailing equilibrium. For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a …xed
number of creditors, we derive an optimal CAC threshold and (ii) given
a …xed CAC threshold, as the number of creditors becomes larger, we
show that there is a convergence to e¢cient information aggregation.
With ex ante debtor moral hazard, a positive interim crisis risk, con-
ditional on default, is necessary to solve the debtor’s ex ante incentives
and in general, there is a con‡ict between ex ante e¢ciency and interim
e¢ciency. Our analysis makes the case for a formal sovereign bankruptcy
procedure.
Extending the model to a dynamic setting to study the interaction
between sovereign debt crisis and endogenous growth is an important
25topic for future research.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we present the missing parts of our discussion in
the main text. Appendix A and B are devoted for the detailed proofs
of our arguments in the debt rollover game, given in section 2.2. In
Appendix A, we derive Bayesian equilibria for the general case when a
creditor agrees to the debt rollover with probability , 0 ·  · 1, if
she is indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the debt rollover. In
Appendix B, we study the impact of increasing , for a …xed , on the
interior Bayesian equilibrium threshold. In other words, for a generic
  0,   1, what happen to ¹ ¤
 as  ! 1?
Appendix A
For any private creditor , given  and , if all other private creditors
 6=  are following a symmetric threshold strategies ¹ , and creditor 
observes a signal , let ¹  () denote the probability that exactly 
other creditors do not agree to the debt rollover given that creditor  ob-
serves a private signal . By computation, note that for given threshold
























































and therefore for two di¤erent thresholds ¹  and ¹ 0, the distribution
f¹  (¹ )g
¡1
=0 is identical to the distribution f¹ 0 (¹ 0)g
¡1
=0.
Next, let us compute the expected payo¤ of creditor  for the two
26cases: when she agrees to the debt rollover and when she does not agree
to the debt rollover. Let25 () = maxf0 ¡ 2g. For any private
creditor , given  and , if all other private creditors  6=  are fol-
lowing a symmetric threshold strategies ¹ , conditional on observing the
signal  = ¹ , creditor ’s expected payo¤ from not agreeing to the debt
rollover is given by the expression 

 (¹ ¹ ) = 
¡1 X
=¡1
¹  (¹ ) +
[¹  ¡ ]
() X
=0
¹  (¹ ), while creditor ’s expected payo¤ from agreeing to
the debt rollover is given by the expression 

 (¹ ¹ ) = 
¡1 X
=




¹  ( ¹ ). Notice that both 

 (¹ ¹ ) and 

 (¹ ¹ ) are lin-
ear functions of ¹  and the slope of 

 (¹ ¹ ) is steeper than the slope
of 

 (¹ ¹ ) and when ¹  = , 

 (¹ ¹ )  

 (¹ ¹ ). It follows
that there is a ¹ ¤


















 2 [01], ¹ ¤
 is a Bayesian equilibrium threshold. For each
















= 0 implies that
¹ ¤
































  1, by continuity of ¹ ¤
 in , there exists ¹   1 such that for
all  2 (¹ 1], if ¹ ¤
 satis…es expression (A1), then ¹ ¤
 2 (01). Thus,
interior Bayesian equilibrium threshold exists.
25As before, we assume that  is an integer.
27Next, to prove that multiple Bayesian equilibria exist, we need to
begin by showing that multiple symmetric self-ful…lling Bayesian equi-
librium thresholds exist. This can be done by proving that whenever ¹ ¤

satis…es (A1), ¹ ¤
 is decreasing in . Speci…cally, note that for 0  , the
probability distribution f¹  (0¹ )g
¡1
=0 …rst-order stochastically dom-
inates f¹  (¹ )g
¡1
=0. For 0  , note that (a) when ¹    + ,

0
 (¹ ¹ ) is less than 

 (¹ ¹ ); when ¹  =  + , 
0
 (¹ ¹ )
is equal to 

 (¹ ¹ ) and …nally when ¹    + , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is
greater than 

 (¹ ¹ ) and (b) when ¹   , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is greater
than 

 (¹ ¹ ); when ¹  = , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is equal to 

 (¹ ¹ ) and
when ¹   , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is less than 

 (¹ ¹ ). For 0  , it follows
that ¹ ¤0
  ¹ ¤
. Let ¹ ¤
 = minf¹ ¤0
1g. Since ¹ ¤
 is decreasing in , the







. Taking into account the existence of Bayesian equilib-
ria with extreme coordination failure, it follows that multiple Bayesian







Finally, for a …xed , we study the impact of strengthening CACs
for the general case when a creditor agrees to the debt rollover with
probability , 0 ·  · 1, if she is indi¤erent between accepting or
rejecting the debt rollover, and for a …xed . Speci…cally, we want to
prove that, for a …xed , if ¹ ¤
 satis…es (A1), then ¹ ¤
 is decreasing
in . For some , let us consider ¹ ¤
. For 0  , note that (a)
when ¹    + , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is greater than 

 (¹ ¹ ); when ¹  =
 + , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is equal to 

 (¹ ¹ ) and …nally when ¹    + ,

0
 (¹ ¹ ) is less than 

 (¹ ¹ ) and (b) when ¹   , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is
less than 

 (¹ ¹ ); when ¹  = , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is equal to 

 (¹ ¹ )
28and when ¹   , 
0
 (¹ ¹ ) is greater than 

 (¹ ¹ ). For 0  
and for a …xed , it follows that ¹ ¤
0  ¹ ¤
. Therefore, for a …xed 
and when the number of private creditors is not too large, strengthening
CACs can help reduce the power of holdout creditor (who accelerate
payments) and crisis risk.
Appendix B
In Appendix B, we study what happen when the number of private
creditors become large (i.e. when  ! 1) for a given . Note that, in
order to ensure that we compare like-for-like, per capita creditor payo¤s
are kept constant throughout the limiting argument. We assume that









Let   1
2. For large , as  ! 1 but 
 ! 0, by Feller (1984, pp.










» 1 ¡ ~ ()
Moreover, as  ! 1 by Feller (1984, pp. 175), 1 ¡ ~ () »
~ ()
 . Now,



















































It follows that for a …xed  and large ,




















Consider, …rst, the case when   1



















(2 ¡ 1) = 1. It
follows that for large ,




































¡1 (2 ¡ 1) »
p
(2 ¡ 1) for
large  and as  ! 1, lim!1
 p
¡1 (2 ¡ 1) = lim!1
p
(2 ¡ 1) =
1. Therefore, for large ,
~ 
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Using the fact that ~ (¡) = ~ () and ~  (¡) = 1 ¡ ~  (), a sym-













































































= 0 and as ~ (0) = 1 and
~ (0) = 1




































 !  + 1
2 ( ¡  ¡ ) as  ! 1. It follows that for  6= 1
2,
 2 (01), as  ! 1, ¹ ¤
 ! .
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